Douglas Crockford gave a keynote at the AJAXWorld East 2008 conference in New York City last week. As ever, Douglas was pulling no punches - his title: 'Can We Fix the Web?' The browser, Douglas says, was behind the times when it was introduced, and it hasn't aged well. It wasn't designed to do the kinds of things we're trying to make it do; we've exploited most of its potential and we're hitting a natural wall now that we've extracted from the browser about as much as is possible.
The browser has serious problems:
It’s insecure: Once an attacker gets a foothold on the page, it can read the page, load additional scripts, make additional requests of the server, and send information anywhere in the world. The browser fails to prevent any of these things.
It suffers from the Turducken problem: Turducken, popularized by NFL analyst and Hall of Fame coach John Madden, is a turkey stuffed with a duck stuffed with a chicken. The Web is like this, with CSS stuffed in JavaScript stuffed in HTML. Text that’s safe in one context may not be safe in another.
The web standards require that these vulnerabilities be present. Douglas identifies JavaScript, DOM and cookies as being standards that lead to vulnerability. JavaScript’s global object and intrinsic insecurity are a problem; the nature of the DOM node tree, where every node can access every other node and the network, is a problem; and the ambient authority system of cookies presents a problem.
Reiterating an argument he’s made elsewhere, Douglas went on to argue that, while mashups are the most interesting development in software in 20 years, they are spectacularly insecure. Any time you have scripts from two sources on the same page, you have an insecure situation, and that is often a baseline assumption in the mashup world. (But, Douglas notes, it’s not limited to “traditional” mashups: advertising as implemented on the web is itself a mashup and is insecure.)
Douglas proposes a three-part approach to “fixing the web”:
Subsets of JavaScript: It’s possible to create safe subsets of JavaScript by eliminating the parts of the language that are dangerous. There are a few subsetting approaches out there; Douglas’s own ADsafe is one and Caja (from Google) is another.
Small browser improvements: Implementing solutions for cross-site data access (for mashups) — like JSONRequest — that can replace current techniques like the script tag hack and iframes.
Massive browser improvements: Douglas suggests replacing JavaScript and the DOM and going from there — effectively building upon the ADsafe JavaScript subset using the tenets of object capability theory to create a secure toolkit for in-browser programming.
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Douglas Crockford gave a keynote at the AJAXWorld East 2008 conference in New York City last week. As ever, Douglas was pulling no punches - his title: 'Can We Fix the Web?' The browser, Douglas says, was behind the times when it was introduced, and it hasn't aged well. It wasn't designed to do the kinds of things we're trying to make it do; we've exploited most of its potential and we're hitting a natural wall now that we've extracted from the browser about as much as is possible.
